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I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans’ scrutiny of policing practices peaks whenever high 
profile cases of police brutality capture the national attention.  In the 
1990s it was the beating of Rodney King and the killing of Amadou 
Diallo, and in the 2000s the shooting deaths of Sean Bell and Oscar 
Grant.  Today, the police shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, and subsequent shootings of unarmed Black men have 
sparked yet another reevaluation of police use of force and of police 
practices in communities of color.1 
 
* Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of New Jersey.  
This Article is dedicated to all of the people who have worked to build police 
accountability across our nation.  In particular, I would like to thank the staff and 
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The regimes currently in place to hold police officers accountable 
for wrongdoing have faced particular scrutiny, as frustrations have 
grown over their failures to hold police officers accountable for 
wrongdoing.2  While there are many governmental agencies with the 
jurisdiction to oversee police departments—including local 
prosecutors, internal affairs bureaus, civilian review boards, and state 
attorneys general—there is a growing feeling that these institutions 
have too often failed when it comes to overseeing police departments. 
An August 2014 poll conducted by USA Today and the Pew 
Research Center found that 65% of Americans believe that police 
departments nationwide do a poor or fair job of holding police officers 
accountable when misconduct occurs, compared with 30% who say 
they do an excellent or good job.3  A separate 2014 poll found that 
while a large majority of Americans (78%) have a favorable view of the 
 
members of the ACLU of New Jersey, New York Civil Liberties Union, Newark 
Communities for Accountable Policing, Communities United for Police Reform, and 
all of the activists and community members who have worked tirelessly to build police 
accountability in Newark, New York City, and beyond.  Working with community 
partners to create the New York City Police Department (NYPD) Inspector General’s 
Office and the Civilian Complaint Review Board in Newark helped me form my vision 
of police accountability.  A special thank you to my ACLU of New Jersey and Gibbons 
PC colleagues who worked to create Newark’s Civilian Complaint Review Board, 
including Ari Rosmarin, Ed Barocas, Jasmine Crenshaw, Larry Lustberg, Ana Munoz, 
Alex Shalom, Allison Peltzman, and Rashawn Davis, as well as the movement’s 
grassroots leaders, including Ingrid Hill, Rick Robinson, Emily Turonis, John Smith, 
Laquan Thomas, Milly Silva and Mary Cruz.  I also want to thank Seton Hall Law 
Professor Linda Fisher and the students in her Civil Litigation Clinic—Natasha 
Beckford, Jessica Maxwell, Brian McDonough, and Dennise Mejia—who provided 
valuable research for this Article. 
 1  While shootings of unarmed Black men are at the forefront of this current 
conversation, the spectrum of practices under review run the gamut of policing 
practices—from a reevaluation of all use of excessive force to stop-and-frisk practices 
and civil asset forfeiture.  The current conversations also come in the context of a 
much broader one on mass incarceration and bipartisan momentum to fix the nation’s 
broken criminal justice system. 
 2  See, e.g., Ross Jones, Many Civilian Review Groups Have Limited Power to Resolve 
Allegations of Police Misconduct, SCRIPPS NEWS (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.wptv.com/ 
news/national/many-civilian-review-groups-lack-the-power-to-resolve-allegations-of-
police-misconduct (reporting how strained police-community relations have put a new 
spotlight on ineffective civilian oversight of police); Matt Pearce, Ferguson Plan for Police 
Oversight Board is Derided as ‘Insulting’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014, 6:17 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-0911-ferguson-review-board-20140912-
story.html (citing residents and policing experts criticizing Ferguson citizens’ review 
board as “weak” and “insulting”).  
 3  Susan Page, Poll: Whites and Blacks Question Police Accountability, USA TODAY (Aug. 
26, 2014, 4:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/ 
08/25/usa-today-pew-poll-police-tactics-military-equipment/14561633/ (discussing  
poll taken soon after the death of Michael Brown, which found that Americans, by a 
2-1 margin, believe that police departments do not treat racial groups equally).  
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police, only 46% believe that police officers are held accountable for 
wrongdoing.4 
How can it be that with so many accountability regimes in place, 
Americans still believe that the police oversight system is broken?  The 
answer is that these institutions, which range tremendously in scope 
and power, have often times failed to adequately oversee local law 
enforcement agencies, and that many of these regimes were rigged to 
fail in the first place given their limited mandates and authorities. For 
example, my research has found that of the top fifty largest police 
departments in the nation, only six have civilian review boards with 
some form of disciplinary authority.5 
There are at least three gaps that exist when it comes to holding 
police officers and their departments accountable for wrongdoing.  
First, and most importantly, there is a need to hold police officers 
accountable for the unjustified use of deadly force against civilians.  
Police officers are afforded extraordinary powers not only to deprive 
individuals of their liberties, but, in extreme circumstances, to deprive 
them of their lives.  When these powers are abused, they lead to tragic 
consequences.  Unfortunately, there are inconsistent and often times 
inadequate mechanisms in place to hold police officers accountable 
for these actions. 
Second, there is the need to hold police officers accountable for 
day-to-day transgressions that normally go unaccounted for and lead 
to resentments growing in communities most impacted by such 
practices, mainly low-income communities of color.  These police 
behaviors, which may include discourtesy, an illegal stop and/or 
search, or an offensive slur, may appear minor when compared to cases 
involving police shootings or use of force.  But when these behaviors 
are compounded thousands of times a year, the impact can be severe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4  Reason-Rupe Poll: April 2014 National Telephone Survey, REASON.COM (Apr. 3, 2014, 
9:00 AM), https://reason.com/poll/2014/04/03/april-2014-national-telephone-
survey.  The same poll also found a split in Americans’ views on whether police 
misconduct cases are increasing (41%) or have stayed about the same (48%).  
 5  See infra app. 
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Take, for example, stop-and-frisk practices,6 which in certain 
communities can take place thousands, if not tens of thousands of 
times a year, as have been documented in cities such as New York City,7 
Newark,8 and Philadelphia.9  In these cities, innocent people have been 
 
 6  For an example of the impact of stop-and-frisk practices on individuals, see this 
description by Nicholas Peart about his numerous encounters with the NYPD: “These 
experiences changed the way I felt about the police.  After the third incident I worried 
when police cars drove by; I was afraid I would be stopped and searched or that 
something worse would happen.  I dress better if I go downtown.  I don’t hang out 
with friends outside my neighborhood in Harlem as much as I used to.  Essentially, I 
incorporated into my daily life the sense that I might find myself up against a wall or 
on the ground with an officer’s gun at my head.  For a black man in his 20s like me, 
it’s just a fact of life in New York.”  Nicholas K. Peart, Why is the N.Y.P.D. After Me?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
12/18/opinion/sunday/young-black-and-frisked-by-the-nypd.html. 
 7  See Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/ 
content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) (documenting stop-and-frisk 
practices from 2002–2015, including millions of stops of innocent people); Editorial, 
Racial Discrimination in Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/opinion/racial-discrimination-in-stop-and-
frisk.html (noting that of the 4.4 million stops between January 2004 and June 2012, 
“only 6% resulted in arrests and 6% resulted in summonses,” meaning that the vast 
majority of those stopped were not engaged in criminal behavior).  
 8  See Udi Ofer & Ari Rosmarin, Stop-and-Frisk: A First Look, Six Months of Data on 
Stop-and-Frisk Practices in Newark, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION N.J. (Feb. 2014), 
https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/8113/9333/6064/2014_02_25_nwksnf.pdf  (providing 
first-ever documentation of stop-and-frisk practices in Newark, which found that 
Newark Police officers use stop-and-frisk with great frequency, in a manner that leads 
to racial disparities, and that the vast majority of people stopped were not engaged in 
criminal behavior).  From July to December 2013, police officers made ninety-one 
stops per 1000 Newark residents—nearly one person stopped for every ten residents—
exceeding the rate in New York City of eight stops per 1000 residents over the same 
period in 2013.  Id. at 5.  Black Newarkers make up 52% of the population, but they 
represented 75% of all stops.  Id. at 8.  The analysis also found that of those stopped 
in Newark, 75% were innocent and walked away without receiving a summons or being 
arrested.  Id. at 10.  See also Dan Ivers, Newark Stop-and-Frisks Fall Under Baraka, Though 
Blacks, ‘Innocents’ Still More Likely to be Targeted, NJ.COM (Jan. 28, 2015, 2:43 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2015/01/newark_stop-and-
frisks_fall_under_baraka_though_bl.html (including latest data available on stop-and-
frisk in Newark, showing that in 2014, of the 17,726 stops the police department 
recorded, 11,903, or 67%, were African-American, 79% of people stopped were not 
arrested or ticketed for wrongdoing, and that Newark police were making more than 
seventy stops per 100,000 people, a rate more than thirty times higher than New York 
City’s rate); Monique O. Madan, U.S. Inquiry Reports Bias by the Police in Newark, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/inquiry-of-
newark-police-cites-a-pattern-of-bias.html (citing a three-year federal investigation 
finding that the Newark Police Department engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional 
stop-and-frisk practices, including that the vast majority of pedestrian stops were 
unjustified, and that Newark police officers stopped Blacks at a considerably higher 
rate than Whites and underreported the use of force by officers).  
 9  See Philadelphia Police Continue to Stop Tens of Thousands Illegally, AM. CIV. 
OFER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2016  12:52 PM 
2016] GETTING IT RIGHT 1037 
stopped-and-frisked, and few have had the ability to seek redress.  Most 
attorneys have little incentive to take an individual stop-and-frisk case, 
as there is little available in money damages.  Prosecutors will not get 
involved unless the stop rises to a criminal violation of rights.  A victim 
can file a complaint with a police department’s internal affairs office, 
but few do so since they lack confidence in filing a complaint against 
the police with the police.  And while some municipalities have a 
civilian review board to adjudicate these complaints, the vast majority 
serve only in an advisory role10 or are not even equipped to 
independently investigate complaints, as this Article explains in 
further detail.  There is a clear need to hold police officers accountable 
for these behaviors before the problem becomes so widespread that it 
triggers a class action lawsuit or a United States Department of Justice 
investigation. 
Third, there is a need for the establishment of agencies, or units 
within existing entities, charged with reviewing patterns in policing 
practices that may reveal broader problems.  This responsibility often 
falls on an inspector general, a position that is part of good 
government practices overseeing large government entities, including 
law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations 
and the Department of Homeland Security.  Yet relatively few police 
departments are monitored through an inspector general dedicated 
solely to them.11  Large police departments should be overseen by an 
inspector general to review whether the problem of police misconduct 
 
LIBERTIES UNION PA. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.aclupa.org/news/2015/02/24/ 
philadelphia-police-continue-stop-tens-thousands-illegally (finding that “despite 
having almost four years to improve its stop and frisk practices, the [Philadelphia 
Police Department] continued to illegally stop and frisk tens of thousands of 
individuals”).  
 10  Take, for example, New York City’s civilian review board.  While it has wide 
authority to accept complaints and possesses subpoena authority to investigate 
allegations of wrongdoing, final disciplinary authority still lies with the Police 
Commissioner.  New York City CCRB Rules, §§ 1-02(c), 1-45(a) (2013), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/ccrb_rules.pdf (“The findings and 
recommendations of the Board, and the basis thereof, regarding case investigations 
and administrative prosecutions shall be submitted to the Police Commissioner . . . . 
The Police Commissioner shall retain in all respects the authority and discretion to 
make final disciplinary determinations.”).  
 11  There are exceptions.  For example, New York City recently established an 
inspector general dedicated solely to reviewing NYPD practices (I helped draft the 
legislation creating the agency and helped shepherd it through the New York City 
Council).  J. David Goodman, City Council Votes to Increase Oversight of New York Police, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/nyregion/new-
york-city-council-votes-to-increase-oversight-of-police-dept.html.  Numerous review 
boards have the authority to make recommendations regarding policy and practices, 
but do not appear to use that authority with regularity.  
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is an isolated one or part of a larger policy or set of practices emanating 
from police headquarters. 
This Article focuses on creating a model of police accountability 
that fulfills the second and third gaps identified above.12  This model is 
a variation of an old one, a civilian complaint review board,13 but avoids 
the pitfalls of previous review boards by bestowing it with the powers 
necessary to aggressively investigate police misconduct, to ensure that 
discipline sticks when wrongdoing is found to have occurred, and to 
keep an eye out for systemic problems within policing.  The model that 
this Article proposes would be independent not only from the police 
department, but also from politics by having a fixed budget and a 
board membership that is majority nominated by civic and community 
organizations.  Such a structure also ensures community voice and 
perspective in discipline and in reviewing police policies and practices.  
A variation of this proposed model is currently being attempted in 
Newark, New Jersey.14 
Given the growing momentum to rein in police abuses, now is the 
time to think creatively on all three of the needs previously identified.  
 
 12  As stated earlier, the need to hold police officers accountable for the unjustified 
use of deadly force is the most pressing priority. 
 13  This Article uses the terms “oversight board” and “review board” 
interchangeably. 
 14  On March 16, 2016, the Newark Municipal Council passed legislation creating 
one of the nation’s strongest police civilian review boards.  David Porter, Newark OKs 
Strong Police Review Board; Union Vows Fight, AP (Mar. 16, 2016, 8:43 PM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a4867d7361a24653ab5a3bc13e727d2a/newark-ok-
strong-police-review-board-union-vows-fight.  This review board will have the power to 
investigate complaints of misconduct lodged by civilians against Newark police 
officers.  It will be comprised of eleven civilian members: one will be appointed by the 
mayor, three by the Municipal Council, and seven nominated by community and civil 
rights organizations.  The board will have subpoena authority to compel the 
production of documents and the testimony of witnesses and have the authority to 
make discipline stick when wrongdoing is found to have occurred.  A pre-negotiated 
disciplinary matrix will decide the discipline doled out.  In addition, the board will 
have inspector general powers to audit policies and practices.  And it will have vast and 
unprecedented public reporting requirements, not only on its operations but also on 
policing practices in Newark, including arrests, summonses, stop-and-frisk, use of 
force, etc.  The legislation creating the Newark civilian review board, however, does 
not guarantee a fixed income source, which weakens its independence and may prove 
to be a fatal flaw if future mayoral administrations decide to defund it.  Advocates and 
community members fought for the inclusion of this provision but failed.  See generally 
City of Newark, N.J., Ordinance Amending Title II, Chapter 2, Office of the Mayor and 
Agencies of the Revised General Ordinances of the City of Newark, New Jersey 2000, 
as Amended and Supplemented, by Creating and Establishing a Civilian Complaint 
Review Board 16-0276 (Mar. 16, 2016), https://newark.legistar.com/Legislation 
Detail.aspx?ID=2573481&GUID=13232B4A-53F9-4E99-8440-8FE11FB761B2& 
Options=&Search=&FullText=1 [hereinafter Newark Ordinance].  
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The model proposed in this Article is just one solution towards the goal 
of providing an avenue to hold police officers accountable for 
wrongdoing that normally would go unaccounted for.  Implementing 
this proposal will lead to a significant reshaping of policing practices 
while also giving civilians a meaningful voice in decisions over officer 
discipline.  Such a rethinking of the disciplinary process will lead to 
changes in the relationships between community members and their 
police departments. 
Some who read this proposal may have already lost faith in civilian 
complaint review boards, particularly as they have proliferated across 
the nation yet have failed in many circumstances to hold police officers 
accountable for wrongdoing.  I share this frustration.  It is important, 
however, to separate frustration over the current models from 
rejecting the idea of independent civilian oversight altogether.  Many 
civilian review boards have failed across the nation because they were 
rigged to fail—they lacked adequate authority and resources to achieve 
their missions.  What this Article proposes has been largely untried and 
is meant to remedy those very inadequacies that have led to a loss of 
faith in civilian review boards. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CIVILIAN REVIEW BOARDS 
The concept behind a civilian review board is a simple one: 
civilians and not police personnel should have the power to investigate 
and make findings on police officer wrongdoing.  Having police 
officers police themselves presents obvious conflicts of interest, while 
having civilians conduct these investigations provides an external 
check on the police.  The hope is that if civilians handle the 
investigatory process, it will be a fairer and more effective one than if 
the police were charged with policing themselves.15  Civilian oversight 
also furthers democratic principles by allowing civilians to have more 
control over their police departments.16 
For purposes of this Article, I use the following definition of a 
civilian review board, a variation of a definition used by police 
accountability expert professor Sam Walker17: an agency staffed with 
 
 15  Joel Miller, Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature, VERA INST. 
JUST. 2 (May 5–8, 2002), http://vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/ 
Civilian_oversight.pdf [hereinafter Vera Institute].  
 16  Id. at 3. 
 17  Professor Walker’s definition is: “an agency or procedure that involves 
participation by persons who are not sworn officers (citizens) in the review of citizen 
complaints against the police and/or other allegations of misconduct by police 
officers.”  Samuel Walker, The History of the Citizen Oversight, in CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1, 2 (Justina Cintron Perino ed., 2006), 
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civilians, and not sworn officers, charged with investigating civilian 
complaints of misconduct by police officers.18  In my definition, I 
emphasize the investigative component of a civilian review board and 
therefore disqualify those boards that review the findings of internal 
police investigations.  
A. History of Civilian Review Board  
Civilian complaint review boards have existed since the 1940s.  
The first one, Washington D.C.’s Complaint Review Board, was 
established in 1948 in response to concerns about police brutality and 
followed lobbying by the Urban League and National Conference of 
Christians and Jews.19  The board was largely ineffective and disbanded 
in 1973, only to be reestablished in 1982 and further strengthened in 
2001.20  New York City established its first Civilian Complaint Review 
Board in 1953 in response to a United States Department of Justice 
investigation that found police brutality and a broken system unable to 
hold police officers accountable for misconduct; this board was 
dismantled in 1966 following intense lobbying by the police union.21 
In the 1960s, the concept of civilian review of the police began to 
take hold as the civil rights movement challenged police brutality and 
 
http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/products/books/abstracts/5330089samplec
h_abs.pdf.  
 18  This Article has a narrower definition of civilian review than used historically by 
others.  I do so purposefully.  When the public calls for independent investigations of 
police misconduct, I believe they are calling for investigations to be conducted by 
civilians and in an agency that is independent from the police department.  In contrast, 
some review boards, while separate from the police department, do not conduct their 
own investigations but rather review those internal investigations conducted by the 
police.  For example, Boston’s Community Ombudsman Oversight Panel is 
empowered to review Boston Police Department internal investigation cases appealed 
by complainants.  Yet it has no subpoena authority, and is explicitly prohibited from 
interviewing witnesses or conducting its own independent investigations.  See City of 
Bos., Mass., Exec. Order, Mayor Thomas M. Menino, Establishing a Community 
Ombudsman Oversight Panel and Complaint Mediation Program, City of Boston 
(Mar. 14, 2007), https://www.cityofboston.gov/ 
images_documents/exec_order_tcm3-9873.pdf.  Other boards, like the Citizens 
Advisory Board in Phoenix, do not even review internal police investigations but are 
only charged with helping to “[c]reate a climate of trust between the community and 
the Phoenix Police Department” and to “[p]rovide a forum where the Phoenix Police 
Department can actively listen actively” to the public.”  See City of Phoenix, Citizen 
Advisory Boards, CITY PHX., https://www.phoenix.gov/police/neighborhood-
resources/citizen-advisory-boards (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).  When the public calls 
for independent investigation of police misconduct, I do not believe they have either 
one of these options in mind.  
 19  Vera Institute, supra note 15, at 10. 
 20  Id.  
 21  Id. at 14.  
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began to call for civilian oversight of the police.  But, it was not until 
the 1970s, when public attitudes towards the police began to change,22 
that civilian review boards began to be adopted across the nation.  In 
1973, Berkeley, California became the first city to establish a Police 
Review Commission with the independent authority to investigate 
complaints of police misconduct.23  Since then, more than 100 civilian 
review boards have been established throughout the nation.24 
Today, there are four kinds of civilian oversight entities.  The most 
active ones, which are the focus of this Article, investigate civilian 
allegations of police misconduct and either recommend discipline to 
the police chief or have some variation of authority to independently 
discipline police officers.  A second type reviews the findings of 
internal investigations conducted by the police and make 
recommendations to the police chief on whether or not to follow the 
recommendations of those reviews.  A third type allows civilians to 
appeal the findings of internal police investigations, with the review 
board reviewing the internal police process and making 
recommendations of its own findings to the police chief based on the 
internal police investigation.  Finally, some civilian boards serve a 
limited auditor function, investigating the process by which police 
departments accept and investigate civilian complaints of 
misconduct.25 
B. Civilian Review in the Nation’s Top Fifty Police Departments26 
A review of the nation’s top fifty police departments27 and their 
civilian review board structures demonstrates some of the deficiencies 
in these oversight systems, as well as the lack of any review boards to 
oversee many police departments.  Collectively, these departments 
 
 22  Walker, supra note 17, at 7–8.  
 23  Id. at 4. 
 24  Id. 
 25  See PETER FINN, U.S. DEP’T JUST., CITIZEN REVIEW OF POLICE: APPROACHES AND 
IMPLEMENTATION vii (Mar. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184430.pdf.  
 26  Working with Seton Hall Law students at Professor Linda Fisher’s Civil 
Litigation Clinic, we reviewed the composition of the civilian oversight agencies of the 
top fifty police departments in the nation.  This included review of the civilian 
oversight agencies’ legal authority, membership, scope of jurisdiction, investigatory 
and disciplinary powers, and budget.  The students who worked on the project were 
Natasha Beckford, Jessica Maxwell, Brian McDonough, and Dennise Mejia.  Research 
is on file with the author. 
 27  The top fifty police departments were chosen according to the number of full-
time sworn personnel in 2013 according to the Justice Department.  Brian A. Reeves, 
Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 14 tbl.2 
(May 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf.   
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represent civilian populations of close to fifty-two million residents and 
police departments with close to 147,000 officers. 
Of the top fifty largest police departments, twenty-six have no 
civilian review board as defined by this Article.28  While some do 
include a form of civilian oversight, such as in Los Angeles,29 most of 
these departments have no civilian oversight beyond the normal 
structure of city government.  The departments without a civilian 
review board represent more than twenty-three million residents who 
do not have an avenue to file complaints against the police that will be 
adjudicated independently by civilians (outside of traditional avenues, 
such as civil litigation). 
Of the remaining twenty-four departments, all but nine are 
overseen by a review board that is majority nominated and majority 
appointed by the mayor (or in combination with the head of the 
police), thus minimizing the independence of such boards.30  For 
example, New York City’s Civilian Complaint Review Board is 
comprised of thirteen members, but the mayor and police 
commissioner appoint eight of the thirteen members.31  The nine 
civilian review boards that are led by a majority of non-mayoral 
nominees are Dallas, Miami-Dade, Las Vegas, Detroit, Atlanta, 
Indianapolis, Miami, Newark, and Albuquerque.  Detroit has a Police 
Commission led by eleven members, seven of whom are elected by the 
people of Detroit, a model that exists in no other review board among 
the top fifty police departments.32 
Subpoena authority appears to have become more common 
among the civilian review boards overseeing the nation’s largest 
departments, with nineteen boards being empowered with subpoena 
authority, including the boards overseeing the nation’s two largest 
 
 28  See infra app. 
 29  Los Angeles has a complicated civilian oversight model, but has no independent 
entity charged with investigating civilian complaints of police officer misconduct.  The 
Police Commission is technically the head of the Los Angeles Police Department.  The 
Commission hires and fires the police chief and can make final decisions on all 
departmental policies.  But it cannot impose discipline.  The Function and Role of the 
Board of Police Commissioners, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/police_ 
commission/content_basic_view/900 (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).  Then there is Los 
Angeles Inspector General who is empowered to conduct investigations, such as audit 
of internal affairs.  It can accept civilian complaints, but will turn those over to the 
Police Department to investigate.  See Office of the Inspector General, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/1076 (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2016).  
 30  See infra app.  
 31  Id.  
 32  Id.  
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police departments, New York City and Chicago.33  But there are some 
glaring exceptions.  Houston, the fifth largest police department in the 
nation, has a police oversight board with no subpoena authority.34  
Baltimore’s civilian review board also has no subpoena authority, 
despite overseeing the ninth largest police department in the nation.35 
On the other hand, some form of disciplinary authority remains 
relatively rare, with only six civilian review boards having it—Chicago, 
Washington, D.C., Detroit, Milwaukee, San Francisco, and Newark.36  
This is the most revealing finding of this analysis and at the core of the 
frustrations felt by the public on the deficiencies of current oversight 
models.  For all of the structures and supposed independence of the 
review boards, eighteen of the twenty-four are subject to the whim of 
the police department when it comes to final decision-making on 
discipline. 
Finally, nineteen review boards are explicitly authorized to review 
and make recommendations related to departmental policies and 
practices, although it is unclear how many of these boards actually 
exercise these authorities.37  In the nation’s largest police department, 
the New York City Police Department (NYPD), a newly formed 
Inspector General focuses solely on auditing NYPD policies and 
practices.38  It is unclear, however, how many of the boards with explicit 
policy review authority actually utilize it. 
Of the nation’s fifty largest police departments, the only review 
board that has a leadership structure that is not majority nominated by 
the mayor and that is empowered with subpoena, disciplinary, and 
policy review authorities, is Detroit’s.  Newark’s review board will also 
have these features once it is built. 
III. KEY COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN REVIEW 
Based on my review of the existing civilian review board models as 
well as conversations with colleagues, advocates, and community 
members from across the nation who have all experienced these 
various models in their respective cities, I propose the following 
features as necessary to create an effective civilian review board.  The 
proposed features are meant to address the weaknesses in current 
 
 33  Id.  
 34  Id.  
 35  Id.  
 36  See infra app.  
 37  Id. 
 38  As mentioned earlier, I helped draft the legislation creating the NYPD Inspector 
General and pass it through the New York City Council.  
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models, including the lack of direct community input in the leadership 
structure, inadequate investigatory and discipline authorities, the lack 
of authority to audit and make recommendations for overall police 
policies and practices, the lack of stable and robust financial support, 
and the lack of transparency in policing practices. 
A. Board Majority Nominated by Civic Organizations  
The make-up of the leadership of the review board sets the tone 
for the entire operation of the board.  While professional staff trained 
in investigative and fact-finding techniques will conduct most of the 
work of the board, board members are the ones who will make 
decisions to move forward with investigations and discipline. 
This Article proposes a board composition model where the 
majority of the board is nominated by civic organizations that have an 
interest in the safety of the city and in the civil rights of community 
members, with the rest nominated by the mayor and lawmakers.  This 
will ensure the independence of the board and its legitimacy in the 
eyes of city residents.  Nominees to the board should have expertise in 
a relevant field in order to be appointed, such as a legal, civil rights, or 
law enforcement background.39  The nominees should have a 
demonstrated commitment to the well-being of the city where they live, 
and a strong understanding of the importance of upholding civil rights 
and civil liberties in policing.  They should also believe in a police 
department that operates in a transparent and accountable manner.  
No member of the board should be a current or former employee of 
the police department that the board oversees, and a majority of board 
members should not have a law enforcement background. 
In Newark, the newly established civilian review board will be 
composed of eleven members, seven of whom will be nominated by 
civil rights, immigrants’ rights, and community-based organizations.  
 
 39  In my review of the civilian review models, I came across several that disqualified 
those with a criminal record from being appointed to the board.  For example, in 
Austin, the Citizen Review Panel requires that panel members have no felony 
convictions or indictments.  Citizen Review Panel, AUSTINTEXAS.GOV, 
http://www.austintexas.gov/department/citizen-review-panel (last visited Apr. 15, 
2016).  In Miami, the Civilian Investigative Panel disqualifies individuals with a felony 
conviction record.  Members, CITY OF MIAMI CIVILIAN INVESTIGATIVE PANEL, 
http://www.miamigov.com/cip/pages/Members/cipmembers.asp (last visited Apr. 
15, 2016).  I strongly recommend against such prohibitions.  A person’s past 
convictions should not be the sole determinative factor of his or her ability to 
responsibly review complaints of officer misconduct; it should not be an automatic 
disqualification.  Moreover, given the racial disparities associated with arrest and 
incarceration rates, disqualifying people based solely on their criminal records will 
have a disproportionate and unfair impact on communities of color.  
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The nominees are presented to the mayor, who then appoints the 
board members subject to the advice and consent of the Municipal 
Council.  The following organizations and entities have nominating 
authority: American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey; National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) of New 
Jersey; People’s Organization for Progress; La Casa de Don Pedro; 
Ironbound Community Corporation; Newark Anti-Violence Coalition; 
and a representative of the clergy community.40  The mayor is obligated 
to appoint Newark’s Inspector General to the board, and the 
Municipal Council nominates three members to the board.41 
In my review of the boards for the top fifty largest police 
departments, I could only find one example, in addition to the review 
board recently created in Newark, of a review board that empowers a 
civic organization with the authority to nominate civilian review board 
members.  The Atlanta Citizen Review Board is led by eleven members.  
Four are appointed by civic organizations: Gate City Bar Association, 
Atlanta Bar Association, League of Women Voters, and Atlanta 
Business League.42  While not giving them direct authority, Baltimore 
has non-voting members on the Civilian Review Board, including 
representatives from the ACLU, NAACP, and the Fraternal Order of 
Police.43 
B. Broad Scope to Review Complaints 
Since the very purpose of the civilian review board is to provide 
an avenue for individuals to seek redress for misconduct that would 
otherwise go unaddressed, the scope of complaints that the review 
board adjudicates must be broad.  The range, at the very least, should 
include adjudication of cases involving excessive use of force, abuse of 
authority, unlawful arrest, unlawful stop, unlawful searches, 
discourtesy or disrespectful behavior, use of offensive language, theft, 
and discriminatory behavior. 
Many of the misbehaviors that would fall under the jurisdiction of 
the board would otherwise go unaddressed if not for the review board.  
Years of such unaddressed misconduct have been a significant factor 
in the deterioration of police-community relations.  While a wrongful 
 
 40  Newark Ordinance, supra note 14, at Part I.2 (a). 
 41  Id. 
 42  About Us, ATLANTIC CITIZEN REVIEW BD., http://acrbgov.org/about-us/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2016).   
 43  See Baltimore City Office of Civil Rights and Wage Enforcement: Board Members, CITY 
OF BALT., http://civilrights.baltimorecity.gov/civilian-review-board/commission (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2016). 
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stop-and-frisk is nowhere as egregious as a police shooting, the fact is 
that the former offense is committed with much more frequency—in 
some cities tens of thousands of times a year—and with fewer people 
paying attention.  A civilian review board that is performing its 
functions correctly will provide community members with the 
opportunity to seek redress for each and every one of these illegal 
stops. 
C. Independent Investigatory Authority 
A civilian complaint review board will be only as strong as its 
authority to conduct independent investigations, and at the heart of 
such authority must be the ability to subpoena witnesses and 
documents, including internal police disciplinary documents, medical 
records, surveillance footage, and other materials relevant to an 
investigation.  Subpoena authority will also allow the board to order a 
person to testify before it. 
Subpoena authority has become more common in the civilian 
review boards that oversee large police departments, but is still not 
standard practice even among large cities.  The review of the civilian 
oversight systems of the top fifty police departments revealed that only 
nineteen have civilian review boards with subpoena authority.44 
Independent subpoena authority is particularly important given 
the historic difficulties of compelling police officers who have 
witnessed wrongdoing to testify against their fellow officers.45  The 
unwritten rule, the “blue wall of silence,” sometimes even encourages 
police officers to refuse to cooperate in investigations.46 
 
 
 44  See infra app. 
 45  See Radley Balko, Why Cops Aren’t Whistleblowers, REASON.COM, 
http://reason.com/archives/2011/01/25/why-cops-arent-whistleblowers (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2016) (documenting examples of retaliation against police officers who try to 
expose or testify against police misconduct) (“It may be true that abusive cops are few 
and far between, as police organizations typically claim.  The problem is that other 
cops rarely hold them accountable . . . . For all the concern about the ‘Stop Snitchin’’ 
message within the hip-hop community, police have engaged in a far more impactful 
and pernicious Stop Snitchin’ campaign of their own.  It’s called the Blue Wall of 
Silence.”).  
 46  In 1970, New York City’s Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, 
also known as the Knapp Commission, documented this practice extensively.  Police 
officer Frank Serpico testified about the so-called “Blue Curtain” where reporting on 
a fellow officer was considered betrayal.  See Report Says Police Corruption in 1971 Involved 
Well Over Half on the Force, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1972, at 22.  
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D. Ensure Discipline Sticks 
An independent investigation will be meaningful only if its 
findings then form the basis for deciding whether and to what extent 
to discipline an officer.  Yet it is at this phase of the review process 
where even strong civilian review boards fail, such as New York City’s, 
where the police commissioner has full discretion to ignore the 
board’s fact-finding or to impose no discipline even when the board 
has found that wrongdoing occurred.47  In 2012, for example, the 
NYPD imposed no discipline in more than 40% of cases recommended 
by the CCRB and followed the CCRB’s recommendation in only 9.7% 
of cases.48 
Under this proposed model, once the civilian review board’s 
professional staff completes its thorough investigation and the board 
substantiates an allegation of misconduct, the board’s findings of fact 
will be binding on the head of the police department, who will then 
determine discipline based on those facts and guided by a pre-
negotiated disciplinary matrix.49  Such a matrix will determine the 
range of discipline options for the misbehavior and will ensure that 
 
 47  In 2012, the NYPD followed the New York City Civilian Complaint Review 
Board’s (CCRB’s) recommendation in only 25 of 258 cases (9.7%).  Officers received 
no discipline in 104 cases (40.3%).  Specifically, the New York City CCRB received 
5741 complaints, and 258 complaints against NYPD officers were substantiated.  The 
CCRB recommended charges in 175 cases, command discipline in 70 cases, and 
instructions in 12 cases.  Of the 175 cases in which the CCRB recommended an officer 
be charged, the NYPD sought charges only in seven.  Officers received no discipline in 
seventy-six of these cases.  Of the seventy cases that the CCRB recommended command 
discipline, in thirty-five cases the officer was only given instructions.  Officers received 
no discipline in twenty-four such cases.  Kathleen Horan & Noah Veltman, Police 
Officers Rarely Disciplined by NYPD for Misconduct, WNYC (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/nypds-poor-track-record-meting-out-discipline-officer-
misconduct/.   
  Under the new city and CCRB leadership, the percentage of cases where the 
NYPD adopts the CCRB’s recommendation has grown significantly.  During the first 
half of 2015, the discipline rate increased to 91% for cases substantiated by the CCRB 
involving a penalty recommendation of command discipline or instructions.  This was 
the highest rate since the creation of the present-day CCRB in 1993.  Press Release, 
Civilian Complaint Rev. Board, NYC Civilian Complaint Rev. Board Issues 2015 Mid-
Year Report: Complaints are Down, Substantiation are Increasing and Video Evidence 
is Increasingly Paramount to Investigations (Sept. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/news-2015-midyear-report-
released.pdf.  
 48  In 2012, the New York City CCRB made recommendations in 258 cases, and the 
NYPD followed those recommendations in only 25 of the cases.  Police officers 
received no discipline in 104 of the 258 cases, representing 40.3% of all cases where 
the CCRB made a recommendation.  Horan & Veltman, supra note 47. 
 49  A disciplinary matrix is a chart that lists all of the various offenses for which a 
police officer may be disciplined and then lists potential punishments for each offense, 
taking into consideration the police officer’s past disciplinary record. 
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discipline will always take place. 
The head of the police department makes the final decision on 
discipline but is bound by the independent factual investigation of the 
civilian review board and the range of punishment included in the pre-
negotiated disciplinary matrix. This formula not only ensures 
discipline when the civilian review board finds that wrongdoing has 
occurred, but it also creates transparency and predictability in the 
process, allowing the public to know ahead of time what type of 
discipline will be faced for which type of misbehavior. 
Narrow exceptions can be made for when the head of the police 
department may depart from the factual findings of the review board, 
but such exceptions must be carefully drawn and should only capture 
those situations where an obvious error had been made in the board’s 
factual investigation.  For example, the board established in Newark 
creates an exception for when a “clear error” was made in the civilian 
review board’s investigation and defines clear error as: “[W]hen the 
CCRB’s [Civilian Complaint Review Board’s] findings of fact are based 
upon obvious and indisputable errors and cannot be supported by any 
reasonable interpretation of the evidence.”50  Therefore, under 
Newark’s model, the police director will make the final decision on 
whether or not there is a clear error in the CCRB’s findings of fact.  If 
there is no clear error, then the board’s findings of fact will determine 
the police director’s punishment of the officer based on a disciplinary 
matrix. 
E. Audit Policies and Practices 
The authority of the oversight board must not be limited to 
investigating individual allegations of misconduct.  It should also have 
the ability to review the underlying policies that may lead to individual 
rights violations.  This will ensure that the review board will be able to 
expose potential problems that are bigger than any one individual act 
of misconduct and prevent future wrongdoing. 
The board’s auditing authority should be broad and include all 
civil rights and public safety concerns.  For example, if the review board 
begins to receive a high number of stop-and-frisk complaints, it could 
be indicative of a policy or practice to set quotas on police officers to 
perform a certain number of stops per shift.51  Therefore, when the 
 
 50  Newark Ordinance, supra note 14, at Part V.E. § 1-17(b).  
 51  See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Stop-and-Frisk Trial Turns to Claim of Arrest Quotas, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/nyregion/stop-and-
frisk-trial-focuses-on-claim-of-arrest-quotas.html (reporting on the testimony delivered 
by NYPD officer Adhyl Polanco on the “20 and 1” rule, where the NYPD leadership 
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civilian review board notices a pattern of many complaints, or a rise in 
the number of complaints involving a pedestrian or vehicular stop, it 
should charge its auditing unit with investigating whether there was a 
broader policy decision or unwritten practice that led to these actions 
by individual police officers. 
Other examples of potential reviews include an audit of the 
impact of a “broken windows” policing philosophy52 on civil rights and 
civil liberties, racial disparities in the enforcement of low-level offenses, 
or problems with 911 call response times in certain neighborhoods. 
By including an inspector general authority within a review board 
charged with accepting complaints of individual misconduct, the 
board will have a firm grasp of any developing trends. 
Once the auditing unit of the board completes its investigation, it 
should have the authority to make formal recommendations of policy 
reforms to the mayor, head of the police department, and city 
council.53  The findings and recommendations of the auditing unit 
 
and police unions expected each officer to make twenty summonses and one arrest a 
month).  
 52  Broken windows policing was first introduced in a 1982 Atlantic article.  George 
L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, 
ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-
windows/4465/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).  The article argued that because 
community members care deeply about public order, the appearance of disorder 
breaks down community controls and leads to community members feeling less 
committed to their neighborhoods, thus allowing for the introduction of criminal 
elements into the community.  Therefore, according to the theory, law enforcement 
agencies should focus on responding aggressively to any public offense that may 
appear disorderly, no matter how minor.  Kelling and Wilson recognized that police 
officers responding aggressively to the appearance of public disorder and minor 
offenses (even those that are not criminal) raises Fourth Amendment and racial 
profiling concerns.  They recognized that Black and Latino residents may be 
disproportionately targeted by these policies and practices, but ultimately they largely 
ignored these concerns.  Broken windows policing has been widely criticized.  See e.g., 
Benjamin Bowling, The Rise and Fall of New York Murder: Zero Tolerance or Crack’s Decline?, 
39 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 531, 531 (1999) (attributing the decrease in homicide rates in 
the 1990s to the decrease of the crack cocaine epidemic, which had begun before the 
implementation of broken windows policing); Bernard E. Harcourt, Policing Disorder: 
Can We Reduce Serious Crime by Punishing Petty Offenses?, BOS. REV., 
http://bostonreview.net/archives/BR27.2/harcourt.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) 
(originally published in Apr./May 2002 issue of Boston Review) (criticizing the lack of 
an adequate definition of disorder—suggesting that what proponents of broken 
windows policing might call disorder may be perceived entirely differently by another 
segment of the population and may actually mean strong community bonds (graffiti is 
one example)—and presenting alternative theories for the decline in crime in New 
York City).  
 53  While the policy recommendations of the board will not be binding, they are 
an important mechanism to highlight deficiencies within the department and to drive 
a public conversation that would otherwise be ignored.  A recommendation by the 
board can also legitimize concerns that had previously been raised by community 
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should always be published as a report to the public. 
F. Secure Funding 
For the oversight board to be free from political manipulation 
that could weaken it, its funding must be both secure and sufficiently 
robust.  Otherwise, a hostile administration could deprive the board of 
its ability to perform its duties by simply cutting its funding. 
To insulate the oversight board from cuts to funding due to 
politically unpopular decisions, the board’s budget should be tied to a 
fixed percentage of the police department’s non-capital budget.  Thus, 
if the police department’s operating budget increases due to the hiring 
of additional police officers, so will the review board’s budget and staff, 
and the opposite will happen if the police department lays off officers. 
The percentage of a police department’s budget committed to 
the review board should be fixed by law.  That percentage must be 
enough to cover the hiring of professional staff to run the board, 
including an executive director, investigators, attorneys to prosecute 
the complaints, and analysts to audit departmental policies and 
practices.  The budget should also be enough to fund accessible office 
locations and hours, outreach, and public education materials. 
In Newark’s newly created Civilian Complaint Review Board, the 
board’s budget is not fixed to the police department’s budget, thus 
weakening its independence. 
G. Due Process Protections for Police Officers 
Police officers who are accused of wrongdoing must be fully 
protected from false accusations and must enjoy the full range of due 
process protections in all stages of the investigatory and disciplinary 
process, including the right to counsel and a hearing. 
Prior to any discipline being imposed, a police officer must be 
able to contest the civilian allegations and the findings of investigators.  
Police officers must be allowed to access the evidence being used 
against them, provide testimony, and offer responses and defenses to 
the allegations of misconduct.  If the review board substantiates a 
civilian’s complaint, the police officer should have the right to appeal 
the substantiation or the discipline.  Throughout the process, police 
officers should retain their rights as civil servants. 
 
 
members and advocates but not taken seriously by the administration. 
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H. Public Access/Reporting 
For the review board to adequately serve the community, 
residents should be able to easily file complaints.  This should include 
the filing of complaints online through the board’s website, but also 
in-person and by e-mail, phone, or fax.  Moreover, to allow for the in-
person filing of complaints, the board’s office should be located in a 
central location and remain open during hours that are accessible to 
people who work or study full-time.  Thus the review board should be 
open during evening hours at least once a week and on a weekend at 
least once a month.  The board should also hold monthly public 
meetings to report to community members on its activities, summarize 
its findings, and have an open session to allow residents to ask 
questions and raise concerns. 
Finally, the board should publish quarterly reports on its website 
summarizing its activities.  The reporting should include the number 
of complaints the board received, the types of complaints it received, 
the basic facts of the complaints (without releasing personally 
identifiable information), the disposition of those complaints, and any 
discipline issued.  The board should also issue an annual report 
summarizing its work for the year and identifying any trends.  Further, 
the board should work collaboratively with the police department to 
report basic data on policing practices, such as stop-and-frisk practices, 
searches, use of force, arrests, and summonses.  This will further 
strengthen transparency and accountability. 
Newark’s board has broad, even unprecedented, reporting 
obligations.  These obligations include quarterly reporting the 
following information on its website: (1) the number of complaints 
received, disaggregated by demographic information on the 
complainant; (2) the basic facts and the disposition of the complaints; 
(3) the number of stops made by police officers during the previous 
quarter, including data disaggregated by date, time, location, 
demographics of the person stopped, and reason and disposition of 
the stop; (4) the number of use of force incidents by the police, 
including data disaggregated by the demographics of the civilian, 
description of the force used, reason for the force, and whether any 
injuries resulted; (5) the number of arrests made by the police, 
including data disaggregated by date, time, location, demographics of 
the arrestee, the offense charged, and how the arrest came about; and 
finally, (6) the amount of money Newark expended in settlements or 
judgments to resolve claims filed against the police department and 
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the basic facts associated with those claims.54  The board is also 
mandated to publish an annual report, compiling statistics and 
including any trends or areas of concern.55 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Building an effective civilian review board is no easy task.  It 
requires a groundswell of community support and a sophisticated 
understanding of the nuances of civilian oversight.  It helps to have a 
willing mayor, city council (or at least a majority of the council), and 
police chief.  And it takes money and time to get it right. 
As a consequence, all too often even well-meaning policymakers 
and activists settle for less—a review board that has subpoena authority 
but no power to make discipline stick, or a board that has access to 
review internal police investigations but cannot conduct any of its own 
independent ones.  Arguably, a weak civilian review board is worse than 
no civilian review board because it gives the illusion of independent 
accountability but actually provides little to no accountability.  A weak 
civilian review board can lead to an increase in community resentment, 
as residents go to the board to seek redress yet end up with little. 
It is my hope that this Article will provide a clearer roadmap for 
how to achieve an effective review board.  Spending several years, even 
decades as with Newark, to get it right is more important than moving 
quickly and getting it wrong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54  Newark Ordinance, supra note 14, at Part V.F. § 1-21(a)–(b). 
 55  Id. at Part V.F. § 1-21(c). 
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APPENDIX OF CIVILIAN REVIEW BOARDS56 IN FIFTY LARGEST POLICE 
DEPARTMENTS 57 
 
Name of 
Department 
Board Name and 
Composition 
Subpoena 
Authority? 
Discipline 
Authority? 
Policy 
Review 
Authority? 
 
 
New York 
City Police  
Civilian Complaint 
Review Board:  
13 Members (5 
appointed by 
Mayor; 5 by City 
Council; 3 by 
Police 
Commissioner) 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
NYPD 
Inspector 
General 
 
 
 
Chicago 
Police 
Independent 
Police Review 
Authority:  
Mayor appoints 
chief civilian 
administrator with 
Council approval 
 
Police Review 
Board:  
9 members 
appointed by 
Mayor with 
Council consent 
 
 
Yes 
(IPRA) 
Yes (PRB 3 person 
panel may 
overturn Police 
Superintendent’s 
decision to not 
follow IPRA 
discipline 
recommendation) 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Los Angeles 
Police  
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
 
Philadelphia 
Police 
Police Advisory 
Commission: 
15 members 
appointed by 
Mayor 
Yes No 
 
Yes 
 
 56  A civilian review board is defined as an agency that is staffed by civilians, and 
not sworn officers, charged with investigating civilian complaints against the police. 
 57  The police departments are listed in size order according to the number of full-
time sworn personnel, with the largest police department listed first and the smallest 
police department (of the top fifty departments studied) listed last. 
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Houston 
Police 
Independent 
Police Oversight 
Board: 
21 members 
appointed by 
Mayor and 
approved by 
Council 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
Washington 
D.C. 
Metropolitan 
Police 
Office of Police 
Complaints: 
5 nominated by 
Mayor (1 from 
police 
department) and 
confirmed by 
Council 
 
Yes 
Yes (if police 
chief rejects 
recommendation, 
OPC may 
overturn chief) 
 
 
Yes 
 
Dallas Police 
Citizens Police 
Review Board: 
15 members, 1 
appointed by each 
Council Member 
Yes No 
 
No 
 
Phoenix 
Police  
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
 
 
 
 
Baltimore 
Police 
Civilian Review 
Board:  
9 voting members 
from each police 
precinct 
(nominated by 
Mayor and 
confirmed by 
Council). Also 5 
nonvoting 
members 
(Fraternal Order 
of Police, 
Vanguard Justice 
Society, Baltimore 
Police, ACLU of 
Maryland, and 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
No 
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NAACP of 
Baltimore) 
 
Miami-Dade 
Police 
Civilian 
Investigative 
Panel: 13 
members (9 
appointed by City 
Commission; 3 by 
Mayor; 1 by 
Police) 
Yes No 
 
Yes 
 
 
Las Vegas 
Metropolitan 
Police  
Citizen Review 
Board: 
25 members (13 
members 
appointed by 
Clark County 
Board of 
Commissioners; 
12 by Las Vegas 
City Council Fiscal 
Affairs 
Committee) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Detroit 
Police 
Detroit Police 
Commission: 11 
members (7 
elected by 
residents from 
each Police 
District; 4 
appointed by 
Mayor and 
approved by 
Council) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Memphis 
Police  
Citizen Law 
Enforcement 
Review Board: 
9 members (8 
appointed by 
Mayor and 
approved by 
Council; 1 Council 
Member) 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
No 
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Suffolk 
County 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Fire and Police 
Commission:  
7 members 
appointed by 
Mayor and 
confirmed by 
Council 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
San Antonio 
Police 
  
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
Nassau 
County 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
 
 
 
 
San 
Francisco 
Police 
Office of Citizen 
Complaints:  
Director 
appointed by 
Police 
Commission with 
approval by Mayor 
and Board of 
Supervisors 
 
Police 
Commission:  
7 civilian members 
(4 nominated by 
Mayor (subject to 
Board of 
Supervisors 
approval) and 3 by 
Board of 
Supervisors) 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes (Police 
Commission has 
right to hear 
appeals from 
Police Chief’s 
disciplinary 
decisions and to 
issue discipline 
that is longer than 
a 10-day 
suspension) 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
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Boston 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
 
Honolulu 
Police 
Honolulu Police 
Commission: 
7 Members 
appointed by 
Mayor and 
confirmed by 
Council 
 
No 
 
No 
Limited –
May make 
recommend
ations on 
PD strategic 
plan 
 
 
 
 
 
Atlanta 
Police 
Atlanta Citizen 
Review Board: 
11 members (1 
appointed by 
Mayor; 1 by 
Council; 1 by 
Council President; 
1 by each of the 4 
Neighborhood 
Planning Units; 1 
by Gate City Bar 
Association; 1 by 
Atlanta Bar 
Association; 1 by 
League of Women 
Voters; 1 by 
Atlanta Business 
League) 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Columbus 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
Baltimore 
County 
Police  
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
San Diego 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
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Charlotte-
Mecklenburg 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
Austin Police 
 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
Prince 
George’s 
County 
Police 
County Citizen 
Complaint 
Oversight Panel: 
7 members 
appointed by 
County Executive 
and confirmed by 
Council 
Yes No 
 
Yes 
 
Jacksonville 
Sheriff’s 
Office  
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
 
 
Indianapolis 
Metropolitan 
Police 
Citizens Police 
Complaint Board: 
12 members (9 
civilian voting 
members (6 
appointed by 
Council and 3 by 
Mayor); 3 non-
voting police 
officers (1 
appointed by 
Fraternal Order of 
Police, 1 by Mayor, 
and 1 by Council) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
No 
 
Fort Worth 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
 
Civilian Police 
Review Board:  
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
No 
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Cleveland 
Police 
7 members 
appointed by 
Mayor and 
approved by 
Council 
 
Denver 
Police 
 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
Kansas City 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
Fairfax 
County 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
Metropolitan 
Nashville 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
 
St. Louis 
Police 
Civilian Oversight 
Board:  
7 members 
nominated by 
Mayor from each 
city district and 
confirmed by 
Board of 
Aldermen 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
Seattle 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
New Orleans 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
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Louisville 
Police 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
Montgomery 
County 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
El Paso 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
Miami Police 
Civilian 
Investigative 
Panel: 
13 Members (9 
appointed by City 
Commission; 3 by 
Mayor; 1 by Police 
Chief) 
Yes No 
 
Yes 
 
San Jose 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Newark 
Police 
 
Civilian Complaint 
Review Board: 
11 Members (1 
appointed by 
Mayor; 3 
appointed by 
Municipal 
Council; 1 
nominated by 
ACLU of New 
Jersey; 1 by 
NAACP NJ; 1 by 
People’s 
Organization for 
Progress; 1 by La 
Casa de Don 
Pedro; 1 by 
Ironbound 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
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Community 
Corporation; 1 by 
Newark Anti-
Violence 
Coalition; 1 
representative of 
clergy. 
All subject to 
Council approval) 
 
 
Cincinnati 
Police 
Citizen Complaint 
Authority: 
7 members 
appointed by 
Mayor and 
approved by 
Council 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
Albuquerque 
Police  
Civilian Police 
Oversight Agency: 
9 members 
appointed by 
Council 
Yes No 
 
Yes 
 
Dekalb 
County 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
Tampa 
Police  
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
 
 
Portland 
Police 
Independent 
Police Review and 
Citizen Review 
Committee: 
IPR Director 
appointed by 
Portland City 
Auditor, advised 
by 9-member 
Citizen Review 
Committee 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
Yes 
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Tucson 
Police 
 
No Civilian Review Board* 
 
* No civilian review board as defined by this Article: an agency staffed 
with civilians, and not sworn officers, charged with investigating 
civilian complaints of misconduct by police officers. 
 
